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Topic VI.
What regulations should be made in regard to subsi-
dized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels in time of war?
CONCLUSION.
1. When a subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessel is
used for military purposes it must be in command of a
duly commissioned officer in the military service of the
government.
2. When subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels, or
vessels adapted for or liable to be incorporated into the
military service of a belligerent, are in a neutral port in
the character of commercial vessels at the outbreak of hos-
tilities, the neutral may require that they immediately
furnish satisfactory evidence whether they will assume a
military or retain a commercial character.
3. Subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels, or vessels
adapted for or liable to be incorporated into the military
service of a belligerent, on entering a neutral port after
the outbreak of hostilities, may be required by the neutral
immediately to make known whether their character is
military or commercial.
4. Until publicly changed in a home port, such vessels
as have made known their character must retain as re-
gards neutrals the character assumed in the neutral port.
5. The exercise of belligerent authority toward a neu-
tral by subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels is suf-
ficient to establish their military character.
DISCUSSION AND NOTES.
General.—As a general proposition it may be main-
tained that a state should be allowed to use its resources
to protect itself
(
in time of war and to preserve its exist-
ence. On land -ar militia is regarded as a perfectly legiti-
mate aid to the regular army, and in extreme cases the
levies en masse are recognized as legitimate hostile forces.
It is not reasonable to suppose that the resources of the
belligerent on the sea will not be summoned to aid in the
preservation of state existence. These resources are liable
to attack. They will so far as possible be called into
(105)
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service. Horses, wagons, railroads, cars, telegraphs, etc.,
are called into service on land; corresponding agencies
will be called into service on the sea.
The objection to the continuance of privateering? was
largely due to the lack of government control over those
engaged in the practice. This control is easily exercised
over those aiding in military operations on land because
a representative of the government is usually at hand to
direct the movements.
An equal degree of control may be exercised in the case
of auxiliary, volunteer, and subsidized vessels maintained
by a government, officered and manned by the paid ser-
vants of that government, and operated under its direc-
tion. The use of such vessels is a matter of great im-
portance, and there seems to be no reasonable objection
to their employment for any and all purposes of naval
warfare, provided that the proper degree of government
control is maintained.
By the first division of the declaration of Paris, 1856,
which, however, is only binding on the states parties
thereto, "privateering is and remains abolished." Some
writers hold that the use of auxiliary vessels, to cruise
against an enemy's commerce, amounts to a practical abro-
gation of this provision. For example, Funck-Brentano
in 1894 maintained that the first article of the declaration
of Paris is practically obsolete. Speaking of the Turco-
Kussian war of 1877 and the Russian volunteer navy he
said
:
Depuis, tous les autres Etats maritimes encouragent leurs
grandes societes de navigation a construire des paquebots sus-
ceptibles d'etre transformed en croiseurs en temps de guerre.
C'est en fait l'abolition de l'article l er de la declaration de Paris,
qui lui-meme abolissait la course. Les noms seuls sont changes
;
la guerre maritime privee prendra le nom de guerre maritime
publiqne, les corsaires s'appelleront des croiseurs, les lettres de
marque seront remplacees par des patentes de commission et les
capitaines corsaires deviendront des capitaines commissionnes.
(1 Revue genprale de droit international public, p. 328.)
To hold with Funk-Brentano, and those who take more
or less the same view, is to lose sight of the essential char-
acteristic of a privateer; to wit, a vessel not maintained
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by the government but operating for private gain; sanc-
tioned by the government, it is true, but subject to only a
limited degree of governmental control.
Recent British discussion.—In April, 1903, a British
royal commission on supply of food and raw material in
time of war was appointed by King Edward
:
To inquire into the conditions affecting the importation of food
and raw material into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland in time of war, and into the amount of the reserves of
such supplies existing in the country at any given period ; and
to advise whether it is desirable to adopt any measures, in addi-
tion to the maintenance of a strong fleet, by which such supplies
can be better secured and violent fluctuations avoided. (Keport
of Commission, Vol. I, p. ix.)
Professor Holland, in the report of this commission
(App. XXVIII, Vol. Ill, p. 265), says:
Under the term "privateers" are, however, not included com-
missioned vessels, commanded by naval officers, under such con-
ditions as would apply, e. g., to the Eussian "volunteer fleet," or
to the specially constructed liners which are subsidized, with a
view to war, by Great Britain and other powers.
In question 6717 of the commission, Lord Balfour raises
the point of difference between a privateer and a vessel of
the volunteer fleet. He says
:
The essence of that distinction is this, is it not, that although
a private person may fit out a ship, or a merchant ship may be
fitted out as a privateer, they must go to sea under the orders
and by the instructions, and on the authority, of the government,
whose subjects they are?
Professor Holland replies
:
It must be a little more than that. They must have naval
officers on board, and it is not a private venture for private gain
as the old privateer used to be. The old privateer had a govern-
ment commission, but their object was private gain, whereas the
modern volunteer fleet and the modern subsidized ships really ?
become part of the navy when war breaks out.
Of privateering, Professor Westlake, in his reply to the
royal commission on food supply, says
:
The second point mentioned in your letter of 14th August was
"whether the practice of privateering is likely to be revived."
A privateer was a privatety owned ship, furnished with a com-
mission of war empowering her to act in all warlike operations,
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but usually confining herself to action against commerce, and
usually acting not under state command but independently,
though subject to state control. The declaration of Paris in
abolishing privateering (la course) does not state against what
parts of this description it is directed, but the regulations for
the Russian volunteer fleet and those for the mail steamers sub-
sidized by Frauce and England testify to an understanding that
the employment of privately owned ships in war under state
command is not unlawful. The regulations for the Prussian
volunteer fleet in 1870 contemplated independent action by pri-
vately owned ships against the enemy's ships of war, and Lord
Granville declared himself unable to object to the plan. If a
privately owned ship acts under state command, it seems im-
possible to deny to her state the right to order her to attack or
visit a merchantman as well as to attack a ship of war. There
remains the independent action of a privately owned ship against
commerce, and this appears to be what the declaration of Paris
intended to abolish. I do not think it at all likely to be revived.
(Report, Vol. Ill, App. XXIX, p. 270.)
In the report
—
Sir John Colomb asks Professor Holland if
—
the mere fact of giviug commissions to the officers of merchant




"Their officers must be naval officers, not merely officers with
commissions ad hoc, I conceive ; they must have been anteced-
ently naval officers, or in the naval reserve, or something of that
sort."
6821. Q. Then they must have been previously officially con-
nected with the naval service?—A. Yes, I conceive so; that is,
before the war. It has never been laid down anywhere, but that
I think is the supposition.
6822. Q. It would be a questionable proceeding, at all events,
to give commissions to men not naval officers?—A. Yes.
6823. Q. Although they were captains of the mercantile ma-
rine?—A. That would not, I think, satisfy opinion at all.
The position of Professor Holland seems to be one
which few governments would care to assume. It would
seem to imply that some outside authority can properly
deny the validity of a commission issued by a state and
can determine the amount and character of the prior
training or service requisite for the holding of a commis-
sion. If, as Professor Holland holds, it is necessary that
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the commissioned officers in command of such vessels as
may be included in the auxiliary navy be officially con-
nected with the naval service before the war, evidently in
a long war it might become impossible to officer such
vessels. It also might be questioned whether an officer of
the mercantile marine or a commander of a great ocean
liner might not be a person more fit in every way to com-
mand an auxiliary vessel than a much less experienced
man whose training had been in the naval reserve or
similar force.
The fact seems to be that what is to be demanded is not
some particular qualification or experience in the officer,
but absolute responsibility on the part of the government
which gives him a commission. In other words, his acts
must be acts of his government because his government
has given him a commission.
There seems to be, however, no valid objection to the employ-
ment in war of vessels of the mercantile marine, provided that
they shall have been duly incorporated into the belligerent navy,
that their officers hold naval commissions, and that they are
under naval orders and discipline. (Eeport Koyal Commission
on Supply of Food, 1905, Vol. I, p. 22.)
Prussian plan, 1870.—The following decree formed the




Royal Prussian decree of the 24th July, 1870, relative to the
constitution of a voluntary naval force
—
On your representation I have approved the formation of a
voluntary naval force under the following- form
:
1. To issue a summons to all German seamen and shipowners
to place themselves, and their forces and ships suitable thereto,




(a) The vessels to be placed at the disposition of the service
will be examined and taxed by a commission composed of two
naval officers and one naval contractor as to their capabilities
for the intended purpose. In this case the owner receives one-
tenth of the price taxed as deposit, whereupon he has to hire the
necessary volunteer crews.
(&) Officers and crews enrolled in this way enter into the
federal navy for the continuance of the war, and wear its uni-
form and badge of rank, acknowledge its competency, and take
oath to the articles of war. The officers receive a patent of their
rank, and the assurance that, in case of extraordinary service
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rendered, they can, at their request, be permanently established
in the navy. Officers and men who are rendered, by this service,
unfit to acquire a livelihood, without any fault on their side,
receive a pension calculated at the standard of the royal federal
navy.
2. The hired ships sail under the federal flag.
3. These will be armed by the federal royal navy, and fitted out
for the service allotted to them.
4. The ships destroyed in the service of their country will be
paid for to their owners at the price taxed. If at the end of the
war they can be restored to the owners uninjured, the sum paid
as deposit is reckoned as hire.
5. A premium will be paid to such ships as capture or destroy
ships of the enemy, according to the following standard : For
an iron-plated frigate 50,000 thalers, an iron-plated corvette or
ram 30,000 thalers, an iron-plated battery 20,000 thalers, a large
screw-vessel 15,000 thalers, a screw-vessel 10,000 thalers. These
premiums will be paid the owners of the ships, to whom will be
confided the distribution in proper proportions amongst the crew.
6. The authorities for all communications on the subject are
those of
—
(a) The docks of Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, and Danzig;
(6) The Marine depots at Geestemunde and Stralsund, and
(c) The sea captain Weickhmann, at Hamburgh.





Berlin, July 2Jh 1870.
The French ambassador requested the opinion of the
British Government on "la creation de cette pretendue
marine auxiliaire," maintaining that it was contrary to
the declaration of Paris. The following was the British
reply
:
Foreign Office, August 2}. 1870.
M. l'Ambassadeur : Your excellency, in your letter of the 3d of
August, requested to be made acquainted with the opinion that
the law officers of the Crown might give on a notification issued
by the Prussian Government on the 24th July last, for engaging
ships privately armed in the war service of the North German
Confederation.
At that time I was not in possession of a copy of that notifica-
tion, and I informed you that I would call upon Her Majesty's
ambassador at Berlin to procure one.
In the meantime, however, and indeed on the same day, namely,
the 20th of this month, that your excellency left at this office a
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note veroale on the same subject, one of the members of the diplo-
matic body at this court gave me a copy of the notification, and
I thereupon referred the matter without delay to the law officers
of the Crown.
I have now received their opinion, of which, in compliance with
your request, I have the honor to state to you the substance.
They advise me that there are, in their opinion, substantial dis-
tinctions between the proposed naval volunteer force sanctioned
by the Prussian Government and the system of privateering,
which, under the designation of " la course," the declaration of
Paris was intended to suppress.
The law officers say that, as far as they can judge, the vessels
referred to in the notification of the 24th July will be for all
intents and purposes in the service of the Prussian Government,
and the crews will be under the same discipline as the crews on
board vessels belonging permanently to the federal navy.
This being the case now, and as long as it continues to be so,
the law officers consider that Her Majesty's Government can not
object to the decree of the Prussian Government as infringing
the declaration of Paris.
Her Majesty's Government will, however, with reference to the
Prussian notification, call the attention of the Prussian Govern-
ment to the declaration of Paris, and will express their hope and
belief that Prussia will take care to prevent by stringent instruc-
tions any breach of that declaration. I am, etc.
Granville.
(61 British State Papers, pp. 692, 694.)
HalPs opinion of the Prussian plan for a volunteer navy
in 1870 shows that the safeguards of that plan were not
sufficient. Reviewing the matter, he says:
A measure taken by Prussia during the Franco-German war of
1870 opens a rather delicate question as to the scope of the en-
gagement not to employ privateers by which the signatories of
the declaration of Paris are bound. In August of that year the
creation of a volunteer navy was ordered by decree. The oAvners
of vessels were invited to fit them out for attack on French ships
of war, and large premiums for the destruction of any of the
latter were offered. The crews of vessels belonging to the volun-
teer navy were to be under naval discipline, but they were to be
furnished by the owners of the ships ; the officers were to be mer-
chant seamen, wearing the same uniform as naval officers, and
provided with temporary commissions, but not forming part of,
or attached to, the navy in any way, though capable of receiving
a commission in it as a reward for exceptional services ; the ves-
sels were to sail under the flag of the North German navy. The
French Government protested against the employment of private
vessels in this manner as an evasion of the declaration of Paris,
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and addressed a dispatch on the subject to the Government of
England. The matter was laid before the law officers of the
Crown, and they reported that there were substantial differences
between a volunteer navy as proposed by the Prussian Govern-
ment and the privateers which it was the object of the declara-
tion to suppress. Lord Granville in consequence declared himself
unable to make any objection to the intended measure on the
ground of its being a violation of the engagement into which
Prussia had entered. Nevertheless it hardly seems to be clear
that the differences, even though substantial, between privateers
and a volunteer navy organized in the above manner would neces-
sarily be always of a kind to prevent the two from being identical
in all important respects. In both the armament is fitted out by
persons whose motive is wish for gain ; in both the crews and
officers are employed by them, and work, therefore, primarily
rather in their interests than in those of the nation. The differ-
ence that in the particular case of the Prussian volunteer navy
attacks upon men-of-war were alone contemplated was accidental
and would have been temporary. At the beginning of the war
Prussia announced her intention not to capture private property at
sea in the hope of forcing France to spare the commerce which she
was herself unable to protect. If the war had been continued for
any length of time after January, 1871, when this announcement
was withdrawn, and if a volunteer navy had in fact been formed,
it would of course have been authorized to capture private prop-
erty ; and there is no reason to suppose that any state acting
upon the custom of seizing private property would make a dis-
tinction between public and private vessels in the powers given
to its volunteer navy. The sole real difference between privateers
and a volunteer navy is, then, that the latter is under naval dis-
cipline, and it is not evident why privateers should not also be
subjected to it. It can not be supposed that the declaration of
Paris was merely intended to put down the use of privateers gov-
erned by the precise regulations customary up to that time.
Privateering was abandoned because it was . thought that no
armaments maintained at private cost, with the object of private
gain, and often necessarily for a long time together beyond the
reach of the regular naval forces of the state, could be kept
under proper control. Whether this belief is well founded or not
is another matter. If the organization intended to be given to
the Prussian volunteer navy did not possess sufficient safeguards,
some analogous organization no doubt can be procured which
would provide them. If so, there could be no objection on moral
grounds to its use ; but unless a volunteer navy were brought
into closer connection with the state than seems to have been the
case in the Prussian project it would be difficult to show as a
mere question of theory that its establishment did not constitute
an evasion of the declaration of Paris. (International Law, 5th
ed., p. 527.)
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Vermes, after explaining some of the earlier discussions
and considering particularly the Prussian proposition of
1870, offers the following opinion
:
Le caractere legal d'une marine vdlontaire depend comme celle
d'une troupe armee, du lien plus ou moins etroit qui Tunit au
gouvernement et des garanties qu'elle presente pour l'observation
des lois de la guerre, sous l'autorite d'un commandant a meme
de se rendre compte de sa responsabilite et de remplir ses devoirs.
II faut reconnaitre que les navires de la "freiwillige Seewehr"
repondent a la definition generalement donnee du navire de
guerre ; celui qui appartient a flotte est soumis a un com-
mandant militaire et possede un equipage organise militairement.
Les proprietaires des navires fournissent ceux-ci ; mais les bati-
ments une fois entres au service, ils n'ont plus le droit d'en dis-
poser : ils regoivent seulement comme loyer la prime convenue
prealablement et dedommagement en cas de perte des navires.
En principe, toute force de guerre commissionnee au service de
l'Etat fait partie de ses forces militaires, sans avoir egard a la
condition anterieure du navire et de son equipage, au fait qu'ils
ont ou non appartenu auparavant a la flotte marchande, qu'ils
sont attaches actuellement a la flotte de guerre, a temps ou pour
toujours. (I Les lois de la guerre et la neutralite, p. 103.)
Later flans.—Several states have volunteer, auxiliary,
or subsidized vessels at the present time. The conditions
under which these vessels are bound to the respective
states vary and the obligations resting on the vessels also
vary.
Russia, fearing a possible conflict in consequence of the
situation in the East in 1877-78, considering that her
regular fleet would not be adequate and that her merchant
marine did not possess vessels readily convertible into ves-
sels suitable for warlike purposes, readily adopted the plan
of incorporating into the naval force certain vessels pur-
chased by a private association of patriotic citizens. These
vessels were to be under the control of the naval authori-
ties and to be officered by naval commanders. The cap-
tain and at least one other officer on each ship is a regular
imperial commissioned officer. These vessels are equipped
so as to be convertible at once into vessels for warlike use.
In time of peace these vessels are principally engaged in
public service, though they fly the merchant flag and are
privately owned.
18949—-8
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Speaking of the difficulties in determining the purpose
for which vessels are intended, Hall says
:
Experts are perfectly able to distinguish vessels built prima-
rily for warlike use ; there would, therefore, be little practical
difficulty in preventing their exit from neutral ports, and there
is no reason for relieving a neutral government from a duty which
it can easily perform. But it is otherwise with many vessels
primarily fitted for commerce. Perhaps few fast ships are
altogether incapable of being so used as to inflict damage upon
trade ; and there is at least one class of vessels which, on the
principles urged by the Government of the United States in the
case of the georgia, might fix a neutral state with international
responsibility in spite of the exercise by it of the utmost vigi-
lance. Mail steamers of large size are fitted by their strength
and build to receive, without much special adaptation, one or two
guns of sufficient caliber to render the ships carrying them
dangerous cruisers against merchantmen. These vessels, though
of distinct character in their more marked forms, melt insensibly
into other types, and it would be impossible to lay down a rule
under which they could be prevented from being sold to a bellig-
erent and transformed into constituent parts of an expedition
immediately outside neutral waters without paralyzing the whole
shipbuilding and ship-selling trade of the neutral country.
(Hall's International Law, 5th ed., p. 616.)
Pradier Fodere explains the idea of the volunteer or
auxiliary navy as follows
:
La marine volontaire ou flotte auxiliaire.—La marine volon-
taire, ou flotte auxiliaire, se compose de navires appartenant a
des particuliers, fournis librement par eux, incorpores pendant
une guerre dans la flotte militaire, ou s'y rattachant etroite-
ment, et verses momentanement dans les forces navales de
l'Etat. Elle est dite volontaire, parce que il est fait appel, pour
sa creation, aux particuliers possesseurs de batiments aptes
a etre utilises comme navires de guerre, ou comme transports.
Ces particuliers mettent librement leurs navires a la disposi-
tion du gouvernement, mais en conservent la propriety et en
recrutent les equipages, selon les regies applicables au recrute-
ment de la marine de commerce. Elle est appelee aussi flotte
auxiliaire, parce que les navires prives dont elle se compose sont
destines a renforcer et a completer la flotte militaire de l'Etat,
dont ils sont consideres et traites comme faisant parte inte-
grante.
Les marines volontaires, ou flottes auxiliaires, qui augmentent
ainsi les forces navales des Etats par contribution des particu-
liers, paraissent reservees, aujourd'hui, a remplacer, en temps de
guerre, les corsaires et si les belligerants qui les organisent sa-
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vent eviter dans cette organization les justes griefs qui ont fait
condamner les armements en course, elles constituent une mesure
irreprochable, qui concilie le droit de la defense des faibles et
la securite de la navigation pacifique. (VIII Droit international
public, sec. 3102.)
France has a direct arrangement with certain compa-
nies whereby vessels are constructed on plans approved
by the admiralty which make possible the conversion of
these vessels into vessels for warlike use. The vessels
are commanded by officers of the navy. At the opening
of hostilities they may be incorporated in the war fleet.
Great Britain in 1887 concluded agreements with sev-
eral important steamship companies. In return for an
annual subsidy these companies agree in time of war to
turn over certain fast vessels at an appraised valuation
and to build ships on plans approved by the admiralty.
As the law officers of the British Crown were consulted in
regard to the legality of the plans of Prussia for a volun-
teer navy in 1870 it may be supposed that the agreement
made in 1887 by the British Government does not fail to
meet the requirements of legality.
By the act of the United States of May 10, 1892, after
specifications in regard to registration, tonnage, speed,
ownership, etc., it is provided in section 4 as follows:
That any steamship so registered under the provisions of this
act may be taken and used by the United States as cruisers or
transports upon payment to the owners of the fair actual value
of the same at the time of the taking, and if there shall be a
disagreement as to the fair actual value at the time of taking
between the United States and the owners, then the same shall
be determined by two impartial appraisers, one to be appointed
by each of said parties, who, in case of disagreement, shall select
a third, the award of any two of the three so chosen to be final
and conclusive. (27 U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 27.)
United States court decisions.—The general position
of a subsidized Spanish vessel is set forth in the opinion
rendered in regard to the Panama in 1900. There was a
contract running between the owners of the vessel and
the Spanish Government.
By that contract, concluded between the Spanish Government
and the Compania Transatlantica on November 18, 1886, and
drawn up and printed in Spanish, the company bound itself to
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establish and to maintain for twenty years various lines of mail
steamships, one of which included Havana, New York, and o'ther
ports of the United States and of Mexico ; and the Spanish Govern-
ment agreed to pay certain subsidies to this company, and not to
sibsidize other steamship lines between the same points. Among'
the provisions of the contract, besides article 26, above quoted,
were the following
:
By article 25, new ships of the West Indian line must be of
iron, or of the material which experience may prove to be the
best ; must have double-bottomed hulls, divided into water-tight
compartments, with all the latest improvements known to the
art of naval construction ; and "their deck and sides shall have
the necessary strength to support the artillery that they are to
mount." All the ships of that line must have a capacity for 500
enlisted men on the orlop deck, and a convenient place for them
on the main deck. The company, when beginning to build a new
ship, shall submit to the minister of the colonies her plans as
prepared for commercial and postal service. "The minister shall
cause to be studied the measures that should be taken looking to
the rapid mounting in time of war of pieces of artillery on board
of said vessel ; and may compel the company to do such strength-
ening of the hull as he may deem necessary for the possible
mounting of that artillery ; said strengthening shall not be re-
quired for a greater number than six pieces whose weight and
whose force of recoil do not exceed those of a piece of 14 centi-
meters." The plans of ships already built shall be submitted to
the minister of marine, in order that he may cause to be studied
the measures necessary to adapt them to war service ; and any
changes that he may deem necessary or possible for that end
shall be made by the company. But in both old and new ships
the changes proposed by the ministry must be such as not to
prejudice the commercial purposes of the vessels.
By article 35, the vessels, with their engines, armaments, and
other appurtenances, must be constantly maintained in good con-
dition for service.
By article 41, the officers and crews of the vessels, and, as far
as possible, the engineers, shall be Spaniards.
By article 49, the company may employ its vessels in the trans-
portation of all classes of passengers and merchandise, and en-
gage in all commercial operations that will not prejudice the
services that it must render to the state.
By article 60, when by order of the Government munitions of
war shall be taken on board, the company may require that it
shall be done in the manner and with the precautions necessary
to avoid explosions and disasters.
By article 64, in case of the suspension of the mail service by
a naval war, or by hostilities in any of the seas or ports visited
by the company's ships, the Government may take possession of
them with their equipment and supplies, having a valuation of
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the whole made by a commission composed to two persons
selected by the Government, two by the company, and a fifth
person chosen by those four ; at the termination of the war, the
vessels with their equipment are to be returned to the company,
and the Government is to pay to the company an indemnity for
any diminution in their value, according to the opinion of the
commission, and is also, for the time it has the vessels in its
service, to pay 5 per cent on the valuation aforesaid. By article
66, at the end of the war the Government may relieve the com-
pany of the performance of the contract if the casualties of the
war have disabled it from continuing the service. And by
article 67, in extraordinary political circumstances, and though
there be no naval war, the Government may charter one or more
of the company's vessels, and in that event shall pay an indemnity
estimated by the aforesaid commission. (176 U. S. Supreme
Court Reports, 535.)
In 1§98 the Spanish steamship Rita was captured by
the United States converted auxiliary cruiser Yale, prior
to April 30, 1898, the International Navigation Company
steamship City of Paris, which was under charter by the
United States and by terms of the contract " under the i
entire control of the senior officer on board." The Yale's
company consisted of two regular officers of the United
States Navy and a marine guard of 25 enlisted men, and
269 officers and men doing duty on board and borne on
the books of the ship but not commissioned by or enlisted
in the service of the United States. The regularly en- ,
listed officers and men made claim that the officers and
crew of the Yale borne on the books but not enlisted were
not entitled to a share of the prize money.
Judge Brawley, in the district court, district of South
Carolina, October 13, 1898. held that the Yale was,
according to the act of 1862, in the class " any armed
vessel in the service of the United States " not of the
regular navy and not a privateer, and that, as in all
cases falling in this class, the statute prescribes that " the
whole amount decreed to the captors shall be divided
among the ship's company," and further, the judge de-
clares in regard to the non-enlisted portion of the ship's
company that
—
If they were not " in the service " of the Government while
performing that mission, they incurred the hazard of being con-
sidered as pirates.
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and
—
that, by fair interpretation of the statute, all of the ship's com-
pany doing" duty on board and borne upon the books are entitled
as of right to share in the prize money in proportion to their
pay, and a decree will be entered accordingly. (89 Federal Re-
porter, 763.)
Japanese court decisions.—In a judgment before the
higher prize courts at Sasebo, Japan, on a protest in the
case of the steamer j^rqufi* April 25, 1905, an opinion is
given on certain subsidized vessels.
In considering the nature of the vessels belonging to the
Chinese Eastern Railway Company it is to be noted that the
managers of the navigation department of the said company are
naval officers or other government officials. One manager at
Vladivostock is. a commander in the navy, and the other a special
service official of the department of finance. A perusal of that
part of the statistical work entitled "River Vessels in Russian
Asia," published by the Russian department of communications,
which gives the statistics of vessels in the waters of the Amur
region, shows that there are in all 163 steamers and 198 other
vessels. It is stated that of these, 45 steamers and 66 other ves-
sels are owned by the Government. Considering now the several
owners of these steamers and other vessels, we can not get the
total number of Government vessels mentioned above unless the
19 steamers and 60 other vessels belonging to the Chinese Eastern
Railway Company are included among the Government vessels.
The indemnity for damages caused the Chinese Eastern Railway
Company by the Boxer troubles in China in 1900 was claimed, not
as due to Russian subjects, but as due to the Russian Government
itself. Considering the above facts, a vessel like the steamer in
question which belongs to the said company must be recognized
as a Government vessel, the property of the Russian Government.
Such being the case, although the imperial ordinance No. 20 of
1904, superficially considered, appears to exempt from seizure
Russian merchant vessels in general, it was promulgated chiefly
to prevent the distress which would be caused by the seizure of
merchant vessels owned by Russian subjects which were anchored
in the ports of the Empire of Japan, and those which before the
enforcement of the ordinance had left foreign ports bound for
ports in Japan, which could not have known of the fact that war
had begun. There is no need, therefore, of argument to show
that a vessel like this which is owned by the Government is not
entitled to benefit by the clemency of the imperial ordinance.
Method of commissioning.—In Great Britain, during
the Russo-Japanese war, it was claimed that auxiliary
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vessels could be commissioned only within the ports of the
belligerents.
It is generally held that jurisdiction over the status
and internal economy of a vessel is according to domestic
law. The belligerent has a right to capture his enemy's
ships, whether or not commissioned as war vessels. The
vessels subsidized, or belonging to the volunteer or auxil-
iary navy, being liable to military service in futuro are
certainly liable to capture in prcesenti. When such ves-
sels shall attack the enemy is not a matter for interna-
tional law to determine. They are liable to capture at
any time after the outbreak of hostilities. They may cor-
respondingly defend themselves from attack. The main
restriction, so far as the belligerents are concerned, is that
the vessels shall be under full responsible control.
In an interview during the warm agitation in regard to
the action of the Smolensk and Peterburg. of the Russian
volunteer fleet, in July, 1904, M. Xeratoff, of the Russian
foreign office, was reported as saying of the commission-
ing of these vessels
:
The questions as to the place where this transformation should
be made had not been settled when certain ships passed the Dar-
danelles as merchantmen, otherwise the Turkish authorities
would not have let them through. The commanders of the Peter-
burg and Smolensk were wrong in stopping neutral vessels with-
out waiting for further orders. They erred from excess of zeal,
but we can understand the state of mind of our officers on seeing
ships pass that were no doubt going to carry out documents and
ammunition to Japan. In any case, we shall make apologies if
it turns out that our suspicions were unfounded. As regards the
question of principle involved in the passage of the Dardanelles
by auxiliary cruisers, this is a matter for discussion. We have
consulted Professor Martens, who is here. But legal considera-
tions will play a secondary part in this affair. The incident is
rather political than diplomatic. We shall continue to display a
conciliatory spirit, but our auxiliary cruisers will not be with-
drawn from the Eed Sea. (The Times, London, July 26, 1904.)
At the same time the Russian foreign office gave assur-
ance that the volunteer fleet would not again "be utilized
for visitation and seizure of neutral ships in the Red Sea."
If Russia maintained that these vessels, the Smolensk
and Peterburg, were not Avar vessels, then they had no
right to make captures but had full right under treaty to
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pass the Dardanelles. If they were war vessels only after
raising their flag after passing the Dardanelles, then it
might be equally proper for vessels of the volunteer navy
of another state to pass in through the Dardanelles under
a merchant flag and raise the war standard after entering
the Black Sea. Doubtless Russia would be reluctant to
admit this practice.
Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, on July 28,
1904, explaining the attitude of Great Britain, said of the
action of the Russian vessels which passed the Dardanelles
and captured the Malacca:
We took the strongest possible exception to that course on the
ground that no ship of war could issue from the Black Sea, and
that in our judgment the members of the volunteer fleet, if they
issued from the Black Sea and took belligerent action, either had
no right to issue or no right to take that action.
In the same speech he said
:
We have received assurances that the volunteer ships are to be
withdrawn from the Bed Sea ; and I have little doubt that there
will be no further desire on the part of the Russian Government
to employ them as cruisers.
The sale of a vessel strictly as a commercial transaction
by a neutral citizen may be made by any party to any
party. The government must not, however, be involved.
In a conference between Mr. Balfour, the prime minister,
and the London Chamber of Commerce, on August 25.
1904, Mr. Angier observed that
—
the Germans had sold to the Russians a considerable number of
fine trading ships, and one of them had been converted into a
war vessel, and had actually stopped one of our ships. That was
a case of the Alabama over again.
Mr. Balfoue. No ; this has has been carefully considered by
the law officers and the Government. There can be no doubt that
merchant ships may be sold by neutrals to any government, and
that that government may turn these ships into cruisers if they
please. I do not believe, in this respect, that we can complain of
a breach of international law. (T7ie Times, London, August 26,
1904.)
Commander von Uslar, of the German navy, says of the
use of auxiliary war ships:
Concerning the hitherto undisputed right of belligerents to equip
trading steamers as auxiliary war ships everywhere, except in
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territorial waters, England has, during the present war, endeav-
ored to enforce her view that the belligerent can legally commis-
sion auxiliary war ships only in his own harbors and not on the
high seas. That the general acceptance of this principle would
be very beneficial to English interests, but prejudicial to states
with small colonial possessions, is very evident ; but it does not
accord with the principle of international law that the state has
unlimited power and jurisdiction on the high seas over all vessels
sailing under its flag. In the interests of all the demand is justi-
fied that an auxiliary war vessel shall not change its character
during the war. (181 North American Review, August, 1905, p.
184.)
The auxiliary navy has been put by some writers in the
same category as the militia on land and has been regarded
as subject to similar regulations. Some maintain that it
should be enrolled for state service under responsible offi-
cers, ba paid from the public treasury and not in propor-
tion to the captures made, and that the vessels should also
be paid for fixed periods and not in proportion to the
captures made by them. In case of loss of a vessel in
war a liberal price should be paid therefor.
It hjas been suggested that a distinction might be made
according to the service rendered. If a vessel of the vol-
unteer navy confined its services to the transport of troops,
coal, and the like, its action would be legitimate; if it
pursued and captured private property, it would be en-
gaged in privateering forbidden by the first article of the
treaty of Paris.
L
1856 (4 Revue Generale de Droit Interna-
tional Public, 1897, p. 696). The above is not the gener-
ally accepted view. It has been maintained also that the
private ownership of vessels which are to engage in war
should not be permitted. The distinction between the
transport by one vessel of fuel which would enable another
vessel to pursue and capture an enemy vessel and the pur-
suit of the enemy vessel by the transport is not the point
to be considered in distinguishing a privateer from a pub-
lic war vessel, but rather the conditions under which the
act takes place. The question is rather one of govern-
mental naval control and conformity to the usages of war.
That a vessel used by a belligerent for hostile purposes
must be owned by the state is not a matter of great im-
portance and is not easily determined in time of war. It
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would not be contended that horses or other means of
warfare might not be loaned by private persons for serv-
ice in war on land.
Hall gives a somewhat full statement of the English
attitude in regard to what constitutes a public vessel
:
Public vessels of the state consist in ships of war, in govern-
ment ships not armed as vessels of war, such as royal or ad-
miralty yachts, transports, or storeships, and in vessels tem-
porarily employed, whether as transports or otherwise, pro-
vided that they are used for public purposes only, that they are
commanded by an officer holding" such a commission as will suf-
fice to render the ship a public vessel by the law of his state, and
that they satisfy other conditions which may be required by that
law. The character of a vessel professing to be public is usually
evidenced by the flag and pendant which she carries, and if neces-
sary by firing a gun. When in the absence of, or notwithstand-
ing, these proofs any doubt is entertained as to the legitimateness
of her claim, the statement of the commander on his word of
honor that the vessel is public is often accepted, but the admis-
sion of such statement as proof is a matter of courtesy. On the
other hand, subject to an exception which will be indicated
directly, the commission under which the commander acts must
necessarily be received as conclusive, it being a direct attestation
of the character of the vessel made by the competent authority
within the state itself. A fortiori attestation made by the gov-
ernment itself is a bar to all further inquiry. (International
Law, 5th ed., p. 161.)
The act of commissioning a vessel is an act of sovereignty, and
no act of sovereignty can be done within the dominions of an-
other sovereign without his express or tacit permission. Without
such leave a commission can only acquire value as against the
state in which a vessel has been bought, or has been built and
fitted out, at the moment when she issues from the territorial
waters. Up to that time, though invested with minor privileges,
she is far, if she be a ship of war, from enjoying the full advan-
tages of a public character. It is needless to say that, on the
other hand, if the vessel reenters the territorial waters five min-
utes after she has left them she does so with all the privileges of
a public vessel of her state. It is to be noted that tacit leave to
commission a ship can not be lightly supposed. A state must
always be presumed to be jealous of its rights of sovereignty,
and either strong circumstances implying recognition in the par-
ticular case, or the general practice of the state itself, must be
adduced before the presumption can be displaced. (Ibid, p. 163.)
Need of established character.—It is necessary that
there should be some mark bv which the character of a
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vessel may be established so far as a neutral may be con-
cerned. It is not in any way reasonable to expect that
a vessel may one day fly a merchant flag and the next
day that of a ship of war and the following day that of a
merchant vessel again. If it is proper for a vessel to sail
from a port as a merchant vessel and on the high sea to
assume the character of a war vessel, would it not be pos-
sible to reverse the process and make such changes as
frequently as might serve a belligerent's purpose.
It is certain that acts of war on the sea should be con-
fined to war vessels and that merchant vessels should not
visit, search, or capture merchant vessels of an enemy or
of a neutral. Under certain conditions a war vessel may,
however, do these things. A merchant vessel is subject
to the jurisdiction of the port in which it may be, so far
as the local regulations require. A vessel of war is to a
large extent exempt from local jurisdiction. There is
little restriction upon the nature of articles which a mer-
chant vessel may take on board. A war vessel of a bellig-
erent in time of hostilities may not in a neutral port do
certain acts or take certain articles on board which would
be allowed in time of peace or to a merchant vessel in time
of war.
If no restrictions are made, the neutrals may through
ignorance of the character of a vessel furnish it with sup-
plies of a forbidden amount or character. A vessel which
could change its character at will might enter a neutral
port repeatedly as a merchant vessel and after each de-
parture again assume a warlike character, thus making of
a neutral port a base. Of course, it is not reasonable to
expect that such acts would be tolerated.
Summary.—There seem to be certain general considera-
tions which should guide in the regulation of the use of
subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels
:
1. Such vessels should be during the war public vessels
under regularly commissioned officers in order that the
principle of Article I of the declaration of Paris, 1856,
may be regarded. They should be incorporated in the
navy.
2. The neutral in whose port such vessel may be or
within whose port such, vessel may come is entitled to
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know the character of the vessel in order that the laws
of neutrality in furnishing supplies, etc., may be observed.
3. The character once assumed should not be changed
except under adequate restrictions in order that reason-
able security may be given to the neutral in his relation
to the vessel.
Conclusions.—From the foregoing it is evident that the
use, for all purposes of naval warfare, of auxiliary, sub-
sidized, or volunteer vessels, regularly incorporated in
the naval forces of a country, is in accord with general
opinion and practice, and that this addition to their regu-
lar naval forces in time of war is contemplated by nearly
all if not all the principal maritime nations. In fact
auxiliaries have been so used in all recent naval wars. To
secure for subsidized, auxiliarv, and volunteer vessels the
proper status in time of war, the following regulations
are proposed
:
1. When a subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessel is
used for military purposes it must be in command of a
duly commissioned officer in the military service of the
government.
2. When subsidized, auxiliary , or volunteer vessels, or
vessels adapted for or liable to be incorporated into the
military service of a belligerent, are in a neutral port in
the character of commercial vessels at the outbreak of
hostilities, the neutral may require that they immediately
furnish satisfactory evidence whether they will assume
a military or retain a commercial character.
3. Subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels, or vessels
adapted for or liable to be incorporated into the military
service of a belligerent, on entering a neutral port after
the outbreak of hostilities, may be required by the neutral
immediately to make known whether their character is
military or commercial.
4. Until publicly changed in a home port, such vessels
as have made known their character must retain as re-
gards neutrals the character assumed in the neutral port.
5. The exercise of belligerent authority toward a neu-
tral by subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels is suf-
ficient to establish their military character.
